Figure: Rates of Institutionalization for Residents in All Mental Institutions and State
and Federal Prisons in the United States (per 100,000 adults)
In the period 1935 to 1963, the United States consistently institutionalized in mental institutions and prisons at rates above 700 per 100,000 adults-with highs of 778 in 1939 and 786 in 1955. And there were a panoply of mental institutions at mid-century, including not only state and county public mental hospitals, but public and private institutions for "mental defectives and epileptics," public and private institutions for "the mentally retarded," psychiatric wards in veterans' hospitals, "psychopathic" hospitals, as well as private mental hospitals. The cumulative rate of detention was at least as high as it is today.
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It is important, then, to step back and explore the arc of penality over a longer course. To relate mass incarceration and these recent developments to their earlier kin at the turn of the twentieth century and to place them within a larger historical framework spanning several centuries-not just decades. What that larger perspective reveals is that the pattern of confinement and control in the past century has been facilitated by the emergence and gradual dominance of "neoliberal penality." By neoliberal penality, I have in mind a form of rationality in which the penal sphere is pushed outside political economy and serves the function of a boundary: the penal sanction is marked off from the dominant logic of classical economics as the only space where order is legitimately enforced by the state. On this view, the bulk of human interaction-which consists of economic exchange-is viewed as voluntary, compensated, orderly, and tending toward the common good; the penal sphere is the outer bound, where the government can legitimately interfere, there and there alone.
This discourse of neoliberal penality-born in the eighteenth century, nurtured in the nineteenth century, and today in full fruition-facilitates the growth of the carceral sphere. Neoliberal penality makes it easier to resist government intervention in the marketplace and to embrace criminalizing any and all deviations from the market. It facilitates passing new criminal statutes and wielding the penal sanction more liberally because that is where administration is necessary, that is where the state can legitimately act, that is the proper sphere of governing. By marginalizing and pushing punishment to the outskirts of the market, neoliberal penality unleashes the state on the carceral sphere.
This vision of an ordered market delimited by the penal sanction dominates the public imagination today and has led to a fundamental separation between the natural order and efficiency of market exchange and the need for decisive governmental intervention in the penal domain. The criminal sanction tends to be viewed today as the exceptional extremity to an otherwise unregulated orderly market, where there-and there alone-the state must intervene to calibrate the calculations of rational actors. It is this precise combination-order in the market and government at the border-that helps shape the modern neoliberal vision of penality. It is precisely this view that is reflected in the writings of Richard Posner, eloquently formulated in the simple but blunt epigraph quoted above-in his idea that the major function of the criminal sanction in a capitalist society is to prevent market bypassing (Posner 1985 (Posner :1195 . In this passage, the idea of market efficiency leads to a penal theory where the only legitimate space for the government to intervene is in punishment. Elsewhere, it must leave alone voluntary, compensated exchanges-as if the space of the market existed somehow independently of the policing, as if the two domains were distinct.
These ideas of market efficiency and of the penal exception trace back, remarkably, to earlier liberal thought. The first-the idea of naturally efficient markets-traces directly to the birth, emergence, and triumph of the idea of natural order in economics. It traces to the Physiocratic thought of François Quesnay, the Marquis de Mirabeau, Dupont de Nemours, Le Mercier de la Rivière, and other early French economists during the period 1756 to 1767. Their writings were highly influential in France and abroad, and it is precisely their notion of natural order that metamorphosed, over time, into the modern economic notion of market efficiency that is at the heart of neoliberal thought.
The birth of natural order in the writings of the Physiocrats also led seamlessly to the expansion of the penal sphere as the only legitimate space for governmental administration and intervention. The idea of orderliness matured into a political theory that combined inactivity in commercial matters with centralized, authoritarian policing elsewhere-what the Physiocrats referred to as the doctrine of "legal despotism." Under the rubric of legal despotism, François Quesnay and Mercier de la Rivière formulated a political ideal of complete governmental inactivity in all but the penal sphere. Given the existence of natural laws governing commerce, the économistes envisaged no role for the legislature except to criminalize and punish severely those who deviate from the natural order. Natural order in the universe implied legal despotism in human affairs. The Physiocrats embraced this doctrine in 1767 with the publication that same year of both Quesnay's essay, Despotisme de la Chine, and Le Mercier's book, L'Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques. Their economic writings led them, in a syllogistic manner, to the conclusion that natural order in the autonomous economic sphere demands both that there be no human intervention (in terms of positive law) in the economic realm and that positive law limit itself to punishing deviance from the natural law, in other words that it limit itself to punishing theft and violence. The logic proceeded as follows:
1. The economic realm-agricultural and commercial-is governed by fundamental natural laws that inherently promote the best interests of mankind.
2. Positive, man-made laws can at best simply mirror the natural order and instantiate natural law. In the economic domain, positive law usually deviates from natural law, producing disorder rather than order.
3. Therefore, positive law should not extend to the domain of natural laws, or, as Quesnay stated, "Positive legislation should therefore not reach the domain of physical laws" (Quesnay 2005 (Quesnay :1017 . Precisely for this reason, there is no need for a separate legislature.
All law-making power should be centralized in a unified executive-a legal despot-who learns and directly implements the laws of nature.
4. There are, however, some men whose passions are out of order-whose passions, Quesnay wrote, are "déréglées" (Quesnay 2005 :1017)-and who fail to appreciate and follow the fundamental laws of nature.
5. The only legitimate object of positive man-made laws, then, is to punish severely those men whose passions are out of order in order to protect society from these thieves and derelicts-"des voleurs et des méchans," as Quesnay would write (Quesnay 2005 (Quesnay :1017 .
The notion of natural order does all the work in this logical argument, and it leads inexorably to a penal sphere that is, on the one hand, marginalized but, on the other hand, unleashed and allowed to expand without any limitation. Since some men's passions are out of order and these men cannot appreciate the natural order, the legal despot has full and unlimited discretion to repress and punish. Man-made positive law serves only one legitimate function: to punish those who violate the natural order, who are disordered, who do not respect the laws of nature. Natural order went hand-in-hand with "legal despotism" in eighteenth century Physiocratic thought-in the very same way that market efficiency today goes hand-in-hand with neoliberal penality.
II.
Loïc Wacquant In this essay, I would like to use the term "neoliberalism" to get at a larger arc of political and social theory that spans several centuries. The term itself-like most terms-is deeply contested, even among those who carefully study the concept (Campbell and Pedersen 2001:270) . I will use the term here to capture at least three specific dimensions. The first represents a chronological dimension. It distinguishes twentieth century thinkers such as Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and George Stigler from early liberal thinkers such as Adam Smith and François Quesnay. The second dimension is more "ideological." Early liberal thinkers had a set of ideas that had not been put to the test; they were, in a sense, more utopian or idealist. Contemporary neoliberals come after a lot of experimentation and some history, including the Great Depression, the New Deal, and the 2008 financial collapse. In this sense, contemporary neoliberalism has a more pronounced ideological element because it often minimizes historical market failure. The third dimension has to do with conviction or faith: neoliberalism here is understood as the belief that we actually live in a free market system in the United States today and that this system has triumphed. It is the belief that the early European markets of the eighteenth century were completely and excessively regulated and that those of the United States today are free.
Overall, then, I am employing the term neoliberal in a slightly larger sense than some of the more critical writings on neoliberalism which tend to focus more heavily on the period following 1970-referring to the period before that as "embedded liberalism"-and especially on the rise of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, on the wave of privatization that ensued, and on the "Washington Consensus" that followed in the 1990s (Harvey 2005 From this larger historical perspective, neoliberalism today represents a set of default assumptions in favor of unregulated markets. It does not map on perfectly to the more extreme market libertarian position associated with the early Chicago School. It is instead a more moderate view: the view that government intervention in the economic domain tends to be inefficient and should therefore be avoided. What characterizes this more moderate view is a set of softer a priori assumptions that are reflected, especially, in the rhetoric of economic debate. In contrast to the more extreme rhetoric of the early Chicago School-for instance, the argument that the free market is practically always more efficient-market neoliberals suggest that government intervention tends to be less efficient; that it is generally the case that market mechanisms work better, in part because of lower transaction costs, but also because market participants are better information gatherers and tend to be more invested in the ultimate outcome; and that government agencies suffer from greater principal-agent problems, are less nimble at adjusting to changing market conditions, and become more entrenched and subject to interest group capture. These are familiar arguments and, together, they tend to promote a loose default position that favors market mechanisms over "regulation"-a tilt in favor of "free markets." It is, in many ways, what Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff identify as that "impulse to displace political sovereignty with the sovereignty of 'the market,' as if the latter had a mind and a morality of its own" (2001:43).
The logic of neoliberal penality facilitates contemporary punishment practices by encouraging the belief that the legitimate space for government intervention is in the penal sphere-there and there alone. The key to understanding our contemporary punishment practices, then, turns on the emergence in the eighteenth century of the idea of natural order and the eventual metamorphosis of this idea, over the course of the twentieth century, into the concept of market efficiency. It is the idea of natural order that renders coherent and makes possible the belief in self-adjusting and self-sustaining markets. The idea of self-stabilizing internal flows that function best when left alone-this conceptualization of natural orderliness, of spontaneous equilibrium, of natural harmony in the economic realm, is what allowed eighteenth century thinkers to reimagine social reality, to separate economy and society, and to relocate and expand the penal sphere.
III.
But it was not always so. There was an earlier time when the organization, administration, and policing of markets formed an integral part of the field of public economy. The young Adam Smith understood this well and in fact used the discourse of police to lecture on public economy, on the regulation of markets, and on monopolies, money, and trade-on how, in sum, to increase the wealth of a nation. In his Lectures on Jurisprudence, which he delivered at Glasgow University during the period 1762 to 1764-after the publication of The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759 but before the Wealth of Nations in 1776-Smith used, and used exclusively, the rubric of "police" to discuss public economy. He identified the principal task of "police" as facilitating bon marché. Once the internal security of a nation was ensured and subjects could benefit from their private property, Smith reportedly lectured in 1762-63, the state's attention should turn to the task of promoting the state's wealth. "This produces what we call police," Smith said. "Whatever regulations are made with respect to the trade, commerce, agriculture, manufactures of the country are considered as belonging to the police" (Smith 1978 :
Smith traced the notion of police to French administration, citing the folklore that the king of France demanded three services from his lieutenant général de police-namely, that he assure the cleanliness and security of the nation and the abundance and cheapness of goods at market. Smith referred specifically to the marquis d'Argenson, chief of police in Paris from 1697 to 1718, and to the legend that, upon acceding to the post, d'Argenson was told that the king of France expected him to take care of three things: "1 st , the clean[n]ess or neteté; 2 nd , the aisance, ease or security; and 3 rd , bon marché or cheapness of provisions" (Smith 1978 :5 [i.2]). Thus, under the heading of police, Smith stated in his 1763-64 lectures, "we will consider the opulence of a state," or, more specifically, "the consideration of cheapness or plenty, or, which is the same thing, the most proper way of procuring wealth and abundance" (Smith 1978 It would take but a small step to extend this logic directly to the field of punishment. The young Milanese aristocrat, Cesare Beccaria, would do just that in his short but seminal tract, Dei delitti e delle pene (On Crimes and Punishments)-published in 1764. The new field of public economy, Beccaria boasted, had tamed and civilized nations through commerce. "We have discovered the true relations between sovereign and subjects," Beccaria declared, "and there is waged among nations a silent war by trade, which is the most humane sort of war and more worthy of reasonable men" (1995:8). The same lessons, Beccaria believed, could tame and civilize our punishment practices, and, in the process, eliminate the brutal excesses of seventeenth century penality. Under Beccaria's influence, the field of public economy would colonize the penal domain and impose the same logic of measured and proportional responses to the same problem of man's natural tendency to deviance. In the penal sphere-just as in the economic domain-the solution Beccaria proposed was to properly administer a rational framework of tariffs and prices. For Beccaria, "police" was an integral part of public economy. Beccaria's lectures in public economy delivered in Milan in 1769-the notes of which were published posthumously-covered five areas: agriculture, arts and manufacturing, commerce, finance, and police. "Of Police" constituted an integral part of the study of public economy-an entire section alongside commerce and finance-because it shared the same rationality, namely that of public administration (Beccaria 1984-90; Pasquino 1991 ).
The common thread in the young Adam Smith and Beccaria is the continuity between "police" administration and economics. For both, the two spheres were completely overlapping. To Smith, the umbrella category is "police," and that category subsumes the discussion of public economy and the wealth of a nation. To Beccaria-and other cameralists of his time-the overarching category is public economy, within which "police" forms one important sector alongside commerce and finance. In both, though, the two domains are seamless and continuous. The two fields overlay.
IV.
It is precisely this vision of a seamless relation between public economy and "police" that gives way in the second half of the eighteenth century to a far different ideal. If cheapness and plenty, if bon marché was the goal of public economy and of the police des grains at mid-century, things could hardly have been more different only a decade later. The contrast is striking and captured by the new dogma of François Quesnay:
Abondance et non-valeur n'est pas richesse. Disette et cherté est misère. Abondance et cherté est opulence (Quesnay 2005:570).
In other words, abundance and plenty do not translate into the wealth of a nation. Scarcity and high prices, of course, are misery. It is abundance and high prices that produces opulence.
This shift would radically transform the meaning, the connotation, and the role of policing-as it did first in the writings of the earliest économistes. From François Quesnay's first published contribution in the field of political economy-his entry on Fermiers (Farmers) in Tome VI of the Encyclopédie in 1756-to his final contributions to economics collected and published in Dupont de Nemours' Physiocratie in 1768, Quesnay would fundamentally reorient the relationship between public economy and "police": governmental intervention in the markets would become oppressive and interfere with the autonomous functioning of an economic system governed by natural laws and natural order. By 1776, the year The Wealth of Nations was published, Adam Smith would no longer use the rubric "police" to discuss public economy. In fact, the word "police" would appear rarely in the text of The Wealth of Nations.
François Quesnay presented his idea of an autonomous economic system governed by natural order in his Tableau économique, first published in an augmented volume of the Marquis de Mirabeau's L'Ami des hommes in 1760. The Tableau was a graphic depiction of cash and commodity flows between the three principle classes of society-the cultivators, the property-owners, and the manufacturers. By means of a simple graph and its zig-zag lines, Quesnay sought to visualize his main theses, namely that agricultural production is the sole source of all societal wealth, that wealth can only be produced by means of an autonomous system of exchange, and therefore that the state must cease intervening with tariffs, restricting the flow of trade, and interfering with other regulations.
Quesnay's Tableau économique received a lot of attention because it attempted to graphically and systematically represent an economic system-what Louis Dumont refers to as "an ordered whole" (Dumont 1977:41) .
2 But what was even more important and influential on future liberal thought was not simply the notion of an economic system, it was the underlying idea of natural order. Systems can function well with external calibration and intervention: an engine may function as a perfect whole so long as one adds fuel. What was remarkable about Quesnay's Tableau is that his system was governed by natural order and was entirely autonomous of external inputs. What Quesnay really contributed was not just the idea of a system, but that of natural orderliness-an idea that would eventually receive its most elaborate articulation in Le Mercier de la Rivière's 1767 book, L'Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques.
The birth or, perhaps to be fair, 3 the emergence and maturation of the idea of natural order helped shape a vision of the economic sphere as an autonomous, self-adjusting, and self-regulated system that could achieve a natural equilibrium spontaneously and produce increased wealth. This same notion resurfaces in the later work of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, and, today, in the work of contemporary neoliberal thinkers, such as Richard Posner and Richard Epstein. The idea of natural order has metamorphosed today into the belief in the efficiency of the market.
It is precisely natural order that makes possible Richard Posner's belief that "[w]hen transaction costs are low, the market is, virtually by definition, the most efficient method of allocating resources" (Posner 1985 (Posner :1195 . In fact, natural efficiency is so central to Posner's thought that he defines criminal behavior in terms of efficiency: criminal behavior is human behavior that is inefficient. As Posner explains, "I argue that what is forbidden is a class of inefficient acts" (1985:1195). The very definition of crime turns on the notion of natural efficiency. In the very same way, the Physiocrats would define criminality as disorder and deviance from natural laws. Today's neoliberal thought traces back to this severing of "police" and public economy.
2 This is precisely what Marx found so brilliant. Marx wrote of Quesnay's Tableau, in his Theories of Surplus Value, that "this attempt to represent the whole in one table that is composed in fact of only five lines, connecting six points of departure to their endpoints, in the second half of the eighteenth century, at the infancy of public economy, was a stroke of genius, without a doubt the most brilliant in the history of public economy" (Marx 1974:399) . 3 Of course, the idea of natural order was not entirely new. Simone Meyssonnier, in her history of the origins of French liberal thought in the eighteenth century, La Balance et l' Horloge (1989) , traces the idea back to Pierre Le Pesant de Boisguilbert who wrote almost one hundred years earlier in the period 1695 to 1707. Joseph Schumpeter famously traced the notion back to the Scholastics-the theologians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (Schumpeter 1968:97) . And Dupont de Nemours himself-the chief publicist and greatest admirer and disciple of Quesnay-traced the Physiocratic doctrine to, among others, the Marquis d'Argenson, who is credited with the maxim "Pas trop gouverner" (Dupont 1808:309). But true originality is not the sole source of influence. Quesnay's obsession with natural order was perceived as new-which is often what matters more. As new and radical. Many believed that it inaugurated, in the words of Dupont de Nemours, "a new science in Europe" (Rothschild 2004:4) and many championed Quesnay as the founding father of that new science.
V.
The next question is: At what price have we come to believe that the economy is the realm of natural order and that the legitimate sphere of policing-of administration and government-lies elsewhere? At the price, first, of significantly distorting and expanding without limit the penal sphere, and, second, of naturalizing and hiding the regulatory mechanisms in our contemporary markets and thereby masking the enormous wealth distributions that occur daily.
First, the distortion of the penal sphere. The new penal paradigm significantly influenced nineteenth century liberal and modern neoliberal thought. This is most evident in Jeremy Bentham's work. Though he, like Adam Smith, would reject Physiocratic thought-primarily because of Quesnay's devotion to agriculture as the sole means of creating national wealth-he embraced and developed a notion of natural order in his economic writings and reproduced-by an odd conjunction of liberal economic theory and Beccarian punishment theory-the same relationship between markets and punishment: natural order in the economic sphere but government intervention in the penal sphere. On the public economy side, as evidenced in his Manual of Political Economy written in 1794, Bentham embraced Adam Smith's liberalism (Bentham 1952 Vol. 3:233-235). On the punishment side, however, Bentham embraced Beccaria whole cloth. In all matters penal, Bentham aligned himself with Beccaria's notion of policing and administration-of a sphere of human activity that must be shot through with government intervention. In fact, the criminal code, for Bentham, was precisely a "grand catalogue of prices" by means of which the government set the price of deviance. The penal code was a menu of fixed pricing-the exact opposite of laissez faire. Beccaria's influence on Bentham's writings on punishment was formative (Hart 1982:45) . Second, the rhetoric of neoliberalism naturalizes the market and thereby hides the massive distributions that takes place there. It masks the state's role, the state's ties to non-state actors and associations, and the extensive legal and regulatory framework that encases those entities. It also hides the freedom that existed before. In other words, it masks both the amount of liberty in the earlier eighteenth century and the amount of regulation today. There is, and has always been far more "constraint" in our contemporary markets than we typically acknowledge today. The truth is, every action of the broker, buyer, seller, investment bank, brokerage firm, exchange member-even nonmember-is scrutinized and regulated. The rules, oversight committees, advisory letters, investigations, as well as legal actions, abound. The list of dos and don'ts is extensive. For instance, exchange members on the New York Stock Exchange may get together and fix the commission rate on stock transactions of less than $500,000-that it, they may set the price of buying and selling stock-but freely negotiate commissions in larger stock transactions (Gordon 1975) . Brokerage firms may combine and use blacklists to restrict retail buyers from reselling their public offering stock during a "retail restricted period" of between thirty and ninety days following their purchase of newly offered stock, but the same brokerage firms may allow large institutions to dump their stock in the aftermarket at any time (Friedman 2002) . The rules and regulations surrounding our modern markets are intricate and often arcane, and they belie the simplistic idea that our markets are "free." The reality is far more complex.
VI.
A genealogy of neoliberal penality-of which this essay is just a sketch-would seek to explore how this The answer that I develop in these pages reflects this nominalist influence: we have developed and deployed these categories or universals to make sense of what are in fact irreducibly individual phenomena, to place discrete and divergent practices into a coherent framework, to deploy simple heuristic devices or stereotypes to expedite our evaluation and judgment. In so doing so, we have created structures of meaning that do work for us-at a steep price.
The historian, Paul Veyne, in his recent book Foucault: Sa pensée, sa personne (2008), excavates a similar nominalist influence in the work of Foucault, drawing particular attention to the opening passage of Foucault's 1979 lectures, Naissance de la biopolitique (Harcourt 2008b; Veyne 2008:19 ). Foucault's method was to critically examine the very conceptions that we construct in order to learn something about ourselves (Foucault 1994:726) . In a similar vein, this brief genealogy asks in essence: suppose that "natural order" or "market efficiency" does not exist. What does that tell us about the work that those concepts perform?
My argument, ultimately, is premised on the belief that we have no way of knowing whether our contemporary practices are more or less regulated, more or less freedom enhancing, more or less coercive. We have far more administration today than meets the eye or that we tend to recognize. Whether it amounts to more or less regulation than there was in the eighteenth century, that is impossible to quantify. But, the fact is, we characterize our contemporary practices as more liberty enhancing 5 -which is precisely the problem. We draw on the categories of liberty and constraint to praise our modern practices. And in the process, we mask the distributions that these modern practices-the free market regulations-operate. As John Campbell and Ode Pederson suggest, correctly I believe, "neoliberalism does not so much involve deregulation as re-regulation of economic activity" (2001:3). The trouble is, it masks all that re-regulation under the façade of deregulation.
Conclusion
It is surprising that the second epigraph was not penned by Friedrich Hayek, nor by Milton Friedmanthough it does echo Friedman's statement that "economic freedom is also an indispensable means toward the achievement of political freedom" (1962:8). No, those words belong instead to Barack Obama, uttered at a time when, in the summer of 2008, the financial debacle was upon us-after the collapse of Bear Stearns and of the securitized-mortgage market. And even after the bottom would fall out of the American banking system-after the failure of Lehman Brothers, the bailouts of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and A.I.G., and the passage of a $700 billion TARP rescue package for the financial industry-President Obama's Treasury secretary, Timothy Geithner, would nevertheless declare that: "We have a financial system that is run by private shareholders, managed by private institutions, and we'd like to do our best to preserve that system" (Krugman 2009 ). Never mind that the American people, as a result of the first $350 billion partial nationalization of the biggest banks, were at that point the largest shareholders of Citibank, with 7.8 percent of its equity, and the largest holders of Bank of America stock, with 6 percent of its shares.
The persistence of this rhetoric of market efficiency is indeed remarkable. The perseverance of both the faith in free markets and the use of that key dichotomy-free versus constrained, private versus government controlled-is simply astonishing. And it has had a significant toll in the penal sphere. By marginalizing and pushing punishment to the outskirts of the market, neoliberal rationality effectively reinforces the carceral domain.
The hitch is that the foundational categories on the one hand of "natural order," "market efficiency," or "the free market," and on the other hand of "excessive regulation," "governmental inefficiency," or "discipline," are illusory and misleading categories that fail to capture the irreducibly individual phenomena of different forms of market organization. In all markets, the state is present. Naturally, it is present when it fixes the price of a commodity, such as wheat or bread. But it is also present when it subsidizes the cultivation or production of wheat, when it grants a charter to the Chicago Board of Trade, when it permits trading of an instrument like a futures contract, when it protects the property interests of wheat wholesalers, when it criminalizes the coordination of prices, when it allows the merger of grain companies, when it polices the timing of trades, etc. All markets are highly regulated. At the same time, in all markets, there is freedom. Even in a controlled economy where the price is fixed, there are variations in the quality of the goods sold and along other dimensions that create product differentiation. These produce queues at certain stores and not at others.
In the economic sphere, there is liberty and there is constraint. What we see is a reflection on us, not on the market. What is most important is to remember that the categories we use to organize, understand, discuss, categorize, and compare the different organizing principles are just that-labels. They do not capture the true individuality of the objects described. And they have the unfortunate effect of obscuring rather than enlightening. They obscure by making one set of objects seem natural and necessary, and the other naturally unnecessary.
This essay is just a prolegomenon, a necessary first step in the direction of properly assessing modern forms of social and economic organization. Necessary, because of the deafening and dominant discourse of natural order and market efficiency. The very idea that we would use the term "free" to describe our current market system-a system which is regulated through and through-is a testament to the work that needs to be done. It may be fair to say that neoliberalism has so deeply and fundamentally distorted our understanding of economic systems that it will take a lot of work to reach the point where we can properly assess different alternatives for the administration of markets and punishment, and in the process dismantle our neoliberal penality.
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